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ABSTRACT
Health-promoting messages can be framed in terms of the beneﬁcial
consequences of healthy behaviour (gain-framed messages) or the
detrimental consequences of unhealthy behaviour (loss-framed
messages). An inﬂuential notion holds that the perceived risk associated
with the recommended behaviour determines the relative
persuasiveness of gain- and loss-framed messages. This ‘risk-framing
hypothesis’, which was derived from prospect theory, has been central
to health message-framing research for the better part of two decades
and has enduring appeal to researchers and practitioners. It has found
its way into several health communication handbooks and is
communicated to the general public. The present article examines the
validity of the risk-framing hypothesis anew by providing a review of the
health message-framing literature. In spite of its ongoing appeal, we
conclude that the hypothesis has severe theoretical ﬂaws. In addition,
we ﬁnd that the empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis is weak
and inconsistent. It seems that, in applying prospect theory’s tenets to a
health-promotion context, some of the theory’s key aspects have been
lost in translation. At the close of the article, we offer a research agenda
for the future, arguing that, above all, new methodology is needed to
bring the message-framing literature further.
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Health-promoting messages can be framed in terms of the beneﬁcial consequences of healthy
behaviour (gain-framed) or the detrimental consequences of unhealthy behaviour (loss-framed). A
large, and still growing, body of literature is dedicated to investigating which type of frame is
more effective under which circumstances and why. Starting with Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s
(1987) ﬁrst article on health message framing, the concept of risk has been central to this ﬁeld.
The single most inﬂuential explanation of message-framing effects has been the notion that the rela-
tive effectiveness of gain- versus loss-framed information is dependent on the risk that is associated
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with the advocated behaviour. In the present article, we argue that this explanation is theoretically
ﬂawed, and lacks empirical support.
The hypothesis that perceived risk inﬂuences the effects of message framing was inspired by the
experiments that Kahneman and Tversky performed in their seminal prospect theory research.
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), people
respond differently to information about the consequences of a behavioural decision depending
on whether the same consequences are presented as gains or losses. In a well-known study,
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked participants to imagine the outbreak of a terrible ‘Asian
disease’, which would kill 600 US citizens if left untreated. Next, they told participants that two
medical programmes had been developed to counter the disease. In the gain-framed presentation,
participants were told that Programme A would save 200 people, while Programme B had a one-third
chance of saving all 600 people, and a two-third chance of saving no-one. In the loss-framed presen-
tation, participants were told that Programme A would allow 400 people to die, whereas Programme
B would result in a one-third chance that no-one would die and a two-third chance that all 600 people
would die. Interestingly, most participants preferred the certain Programme A when the conse-
quences were framed as gains, while the majority preferred the uncertain Programme B when the
consequences were framed as losses, even though the expected utility in all four options is exactly
the same. These ﬁndings seemed to suggest that people are risk-averse (i.e., avoiding uncertainty)
when considering how to bring about gains, but risk-seeking (i.e., favouring uncertainty) when con-
sidering how to avoid losses.
This reasoning was ﬁrst applied to the persuasion ﬁeld by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987). Because
Kahneman and Tversky’s research showed that gain-framed information makes people risk-averse,
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) argued that gain-framed messages would be especially effective
in promoting safe behaviours, like exercising, eating vegetables or indeed all behaviours that
serve to prevent illness. On the other hand, because Kahneman and Tversky’s research showed
that loss-framed information makes people willing to take risks, Meyerowitz and Chaiken argued
that loss-framed information would be more effective to promote risky behaviours. With ‘risky’ behav-
iour, they chieﬂy meant disease-detection behaviours, because these entail the possibility (i.e., risk) of
ﬁnding out that one is ill. This line of reasoning, which we shall refer to as the ‘risk-framing hypoth-
esis’, was adopted by Rothman, Salovey and colleagues (Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Rothman, Salovey,
Antone, Keough, & Drake Martin, 1993) and has loomed large in message-framing research ever since.
In the present article, we argue that the risk-framing hypothesis is problematic. In the ﬁrst section
of the article, we re-examine the hypothesis’ theoretical underpinnings, arguing that these are
ﬂawed. In the second section of the article, we assess the empirical evidence in favour of the risk-
framing hypothesis and conclude that it is weak. We also note that proponents of the hypothesis
more often than not have had to rely on additional hypotheses in order not to discard it. We conclude
that alternative accounts of message-framing effects are necessary to provide a better explanation of
the empirical ﬁndings.
Not all of our arguments are new. Some authors have criticised the notion that the risk associated
with the advocated behaviour determines the relative effectiveness of gain- and loss-framed mess-
ages, both on empirical and on theoretical grounds (Cox, Cox, & Zimet, 2006; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).
However, it should be noted that the momentum of the risk-framing hypothesis has not been slowed
by those previous criticisms. Even though it is no longer the only account of message-framing effects
available in the literature, it is still widely used to guide research (e.g., Shen & Mercer Kollar, 2015;
Wansink & Pope, 2014). In addition, the risk-framing hypothesis has made its way into a number
of handbooks for undergraduates (e.g., Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2014; Suls & Wallston, 2008) and is
also communicated to practitioners and to the public, most notably on the website of the American
Psychological Association (APA): http://www.apa.org/research/action/motivate.aspx.
If we are right, and the risk-framing hypothesis is problematic, this means that academia wastes a
lot of time investigating and writing about a hypothesis that should by now be discarded. More
seriously, it means that young aspiring professionals and academics, those working in
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prevention, and the public at large, are taught the wrong lessons from scientiﬁc research, and that
public-health campaigns may not be based on sound science. For this reason, we set out to
review the available evidence on the topic.
Perceived risk and message framing: a theoretical critique
As several authors have done before us (Cox et al., 2006; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006), we argue that the
tenets of the risk-framing hypothesis are ﬂawed. Even if its predictions are partly supported by
empirical evidence, the model simply does not deliver a satisfactory explanation of these ﬁndings.
Central to our argument is the notion that, although Kahneman and Tversky’s research can be
said to have revealed something fundamental about human decision making, its results cannot be
directly translated to a health-promotion context. We base this proposition on two arguments.
First, we argue that prospect theory’s conceptualisation of risk differs fundamentally from the way
risk has been conceptualised in the risk-framing hypothesis and that it is unlikely that these different
kinds of ‘risk’ will have similar effects. Second, we argue that the way Kahneman and Tversky pre-
sented their participants with information is signiﬁcantly different from the way health-promotion
messages are presented to participants in health message-framing studies.
Conceptualisation of risk
When considering the application of prospect theory’s tenets to health message framing, a ﬁrst
problem is that the uncertainty that is so central to prospect theory is fundamentally different
from the risk that is central to the risk-framing hypothesis. Kahneman and Tversky use the term
‘risk’ to mean variance of potential outcomes. Importantly, this variance consists of both upside
and downside potential, referring to situations in which it cannot be known for certain which
outcome, good or bad, all lives saved or no lives saved, will prevail (Cox et al., 2006). The risk-
framing hypothesis, however, conceptualises risk as the possibility of something bad happening,
suggesting that detection behaviours are risky because they entail the chance of ﬁnding out that
one is ill. By omitting potential positive outcomes (upside risks) from this conceptualisation, it is
unclear why people would ever be motivated to accept the risk in the ﬁrst place (Cox et al., 2006).
The difference between risk as danger and risk as uncertainty may seem of little consequence to
some readers. Indeed, Rothman and Salovey themselves have noted the difference, saying that ‘the
risk associated with a behavioural alternative usually cannot be deﬁned in terms of the actual likeli-
hood of a particular outcome’ and that, in their reasoning, ‘[… ] risky reﬂects the subjective percep-
tion that to perform a behaviour may involve an unpleasant outcome’ (Rothman & Salovey, 1997,
p. 5). However, they then continued their reasoning without ascribing much importance to this differ-
ence. But conceptualising risk in terms of perceived danger rather than in terms of uncertainty makes
a world of difference. To illustrate this, let us investigate the claim that detection and prevention
behaviours differ in ‘perceived risk’.
Most likely, the reason that the risk-framing hypothesis has remained so popular with researchers
is the fact that it offers such clear-cut recommendations: use gain-framed information with preven-
tion behaviours and use loss-framed information with detection behaviours. But how plausible is it
exactly that prevention and detection behaviours differ in perceived risk? If perceived risk is con-
strued as ‘the possibility of something bad happening’, then indeed an argument can be made
that people ﬁnd detection behaviour ‘risky’. If, however, we conceptualise risk as uncertainty, as pro-
spect theory does, then the difference between detection and prevention behaviour is not so
straightforward at all.
To be sure, there is a lot of uncertainty involved in detection behaviours. In the short term, no one
can be sure whether self-examination or screening will result in ﬁnding potential symptoms. In the
longer term, ﬁnding potential symptoms is no guarantee for effective treatment, and not ﬁnding
any potential symptoms is no guarantee of living a long, healthy life.
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But the question is not whether detection behaviour involves uncertainty; the question is whether
engaging in detection behaviour can be construed as resulting in more uncertainty relative to not
engaging in detection behaviour. Only then can detection behaviour be considered as the option
with truly uncertain consequences in contrast to the certain consequences of the alternative
option of not engaging in detection behaviour (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007). There is no empirical evi-
dence for this, and it hardly seems plausible. In fact, one might argue that engaging in detection
behaviour is actually an attempt to reduce uncertainty regarding one’s health status (Cox et al.,
2006; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).
To a lesser extent, this reasoning applies to prevention behaviours: although people may engage
in prevention behaviours to avoid disease, both engaging and not engaging in prevention beha-
viours can have a whole range of unforeseen and uncertain consequences. It thus seems that, in
the attempt to derive the risk-framing hypothesis from prospect theory, ‘key aspects of prospect
theory [… ] were lost in translation’ (Cox et al., 2006, p. 89).
Risky choice framing versus goal framing
Perhaps the risk-framing hypothesis could be salvaged, even in light of our reasoning concerning per-
ceived risk. After all, one could still argue that perceptions of uncertainty, rather than perceptions of
danger, concerning recommended health behaviours inﬂuence the effects of message framing.
However, there is an additional reason why the tenets of prospect theory are hard to apply to
health message framing and that is the difference between the kind of framing that is used in Kahne-
man and Tversky’s experiments compared to health message-framing studies.
To be sure, both in Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments and in health message-framing research,
participants are provided with information about the consequences of their decisions. However,
Levin et al. (1998) have already noted that the kind of framing that is used in prospect theory exper-
iments, which they have called ‘risky choice framing’, gives recipients all available information on two
clearly delineated options, without trying to persuade them to choose one kind or another. In ‘goal
framing’, the term Levin et al. use to describe the framing of persuasive messages, the consequences
of only one behavioural alternative are mentioned and the information has the obvious goal of trying
to persuade recipients to select one of the alternatives (i.e., compliance with the recommendations).
O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) have also raised this point, referring to ‘decision framing’ and ‘message
framing’, respectively.
The difference is substantial. In risky choice framing, participants are provided with a clear choice
between two well-described and simple alternatives, one with a certain outcome and one with an
uncertain outcome, and the way the information is framed turns out to inﬂuence participants’ pre-
ferences with regards to the alternatives. In order to hypothesise that goal framing exerts a similar
inﬂuence, one has to suppose that recipients of information about one option (performing the rec-
ommended behaviour in gain-framed information and not performing the recommended behaviour
in loss-framed information) spontaneously consider the consequences of the behavioural alternative,
engaging in a mental comparison of the two alternatives. But how likely is it that they will do this?
Moreover, how likely is it that they will think about the consequences of both options in the same
‘frame’? That is, how likely is it that they will think only of the positive consequences of both alterna-
tives when they have been exposed to a gain frame, and think only of the negative consequences of
both alternatives when they have been exposed to a loss frame?
Another crucial difference has also been overlooked in the literature, namely the fact that, in
health message framing, a ‘reference outcome’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 258) is missing. In pro-
spect theory, outcomes are expressed as positive or negative deviations (gains or losses) from a refer-
ence outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Consider the gain-framed version of the Asian disease
dilemma. This version casts the consequences of the decision in terms of lives saved, thereby
evoking the implicit reference outcome of ‘zero lives saved’. In light of this ‘zero lives saved’ reference
point, the certain course of action (‘200 lives saved’) seems more attractive to the majority of
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participants than the uncertain course of action. The loss-framed version, in contrast, casts the con-
sequences of the decision in terms of lives lost, hence evoking the neutral reference outcome of ‘zero
lives lost’. In light of the ‘zero lives lost’ reference point, the certain course of action (‘400 lives lost’)
now seems less attractive to the majority of participants than the uncertain course of action. Thus,
participants in Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment may have thought that they were comparing
the certain course of action with the uncertain course of action, but what they actually were doing
was comparing both options with the reference outcome. In health message framing, this reference
outcome is wholly absent. Thus, even if we were to concede that recipients of framed health mess-
ages engage in a mental comparison of compliance and non-compliance, there is no reference
outcome to make prospect theory’s framing effects plausible.
In sum, in risky choice paradigms, participants are given a choice between two clearly delineated
options, of which they are given all relevant information. Both options have positive as well as nega-
tive consequences, one option constituting a mediocre, but certain choice, and one option constitut-
ing a high-stakes gamble. In goal framing, the consequences of only one behavioural choice are
communicated. It is unlikely that upon receiving this information participants would construe their
situation as entailing a clear choice between two options, healthy and unhealthy behaviour. And
even if they would, the absence of a reference outcome makes it unlikely that health message-
framing effects could be directly predicted from prospect theory.
These problems with the risk-framing hypothesis cast doubt on its ability to foster our knowledge
of message-framing effects or to advise practitioners on whether to use gain- or loss-framing in their
messages. It would lead one to expect that the empirical evidence in favour of the model must be
weak at best. Given the enormous inﬂuence of the risk-framing hypothesis on the message-
framing literature, however, it is warranted to investigate its empirical support with equal rigour as
its theoretical plausibility. We will do this in the next section.
Perceived risk and message framing: empirical evidence
It is noteworthy that the predictions of the risk-framing hypothesis together make up a model of
mediated moderation, with perceived risk mediating the moderating inﬂuence of behavioural
function. And it should not be difﬁcult to test the entire model. That is, a group of participants
could be exposed to either gain- or loss-framed information about either prevention- or detec-
tion behaviour, the perceived risk associated with the recommended behaviour could be
assessed and relevant outcome measures could be included to assess persuasion. We know of
only one study, however, that offered such a comprehensive test of the entire model. This
study (Cox et al., 2006, Study 1) manipulated the function (prevention versus detection) of a
health product, assessed the extent to which participants considered the product as risky, and
combined the manipulation of behavioural function with a manipulation of message framing
to investigate effects on persuasive outcome measures. The results, however, were not at all in
line with the risk-framing hypothesis’ predictions. Prevention and detection products did not
differ in perceived risk, and the predicted interaction between function and framing failed to
materialise. In fact, the results pointed in the opposite direction, with a (non-signiﬁcant) gain-
framed advantage in the high-risk condition and a (non-signiﬁcant) loss-framed advantage in
the low-risk condition (see also Van ’t Riet et al., 2014, Study 1).
To our knowledge, Cox et al.’s (2006) study provides the only full test of the risk-framing hypoth-
esis. In the absence of other comprehensive tests, it seems that we must piece together the empirical
evidence on the model’s separate predictions. We will do this in the next section, ﬁrst reviewing
studies in which, like in the study by Cox and colleagues, behavioural function was manipulated
experimentally. Afterwards, we will review the meta-analytic evidence for the interaction between
behavioural function and message framing. In a third section, we will investigate the empirical evi-
dence for the moderating effect of perceived risk on message-framing effects.
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Behavioural function and message framing: experimental evidence
Several studies have experimentally manipulated behavioural function to investigate its inﬂuence on
the effects of message framing. Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiller, and Salovey (1999) were the
ﬁrst to design an experiment in which the same behaviour was described to participants as either
a prevention or a detection behaviour. The results of a ﬁrst study revealed that there was no
overall function by framing interaction effect, but the authors did ﬁnd a three-way interaction
among Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), behavioural function and framing.
For those participants with a high NFC, loss-framed information was more persuasive than gain-
framed information in the detection condition, whereas no signiﬁcant difference between gain-
and loss-framed was found in the prevention condition. The results of a second experiment
showed that gain-framed information was more persuasive than loss-framed information in the pre-
vention condition, whereas loss-framed information was more persuasive than gain-framed infor-
mation in the detection condition.
The results of Study 1 are somewhat problematic: an interaction with NFC is found, even though
NFC does not play a signiﬁcant role in prospect theory or in Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s (1987) original
reasoning. Study 2, on the other hand, seemed to yield unqualiﬁed and strong support for the risk-
framing hypothesis. As shown above, however, Cox et al. (2006) attempted to replicate these results
and failed to ﬁnd an interaction between product function and framing. As such, it seems that only
three studies employed a sufﬁciently strong design to be able to directly test message-framing
effects for prevention versus detection behaviours. Between these three studies, the evidence for
the function by framing interaction is inconsistent.
Behavioural function and message framing: meta-analytic evidence
In the absence of additional experimental evidence, we could turn our attention to the large number
of message-framing studies that investigate the effects of message framing in the context of one
behaviour. Although different health behaviours are very hard to compare, meta-analyses can go
some way to rectifying this problem by synthesising the results for a large number of different pre-
vention and detection behaviours (e.g., Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2013; Tannenbaum et al., 2015). As it
turns out, the persuasive effects of gain- and loss-framed messages have been investigated in
several meta-analyses (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012; Levin et al., 1998; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006,
2007, 2009). One of the meta-analytic studies (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007) focused on prevention beha-
viours and found a signiﬁcant but weak advantage of gain-framed messages over loss-framed mess-
ages (r = .032). A particularly strong effect was found for framed information that promoted dental
hygiene behaviours, such as ﬂossing (r = .154). In fact, the overall advantage of gain-framed infor-
mation seemed entirely due to dental hygiene behaviours, as the analyses showed that no signiﬁcant
advantage of gain-framed information was found when dental hygiene behaviours were excluded
from the analysis. A second meta-analysis investigated framing effects for detection behaviours
and found a similar weak but signiﬁcant effect in the hypothesised direction (r =−.039; O’Keefe &
Jensen, 2009). However, as for prevention behaviours, the effect was entirely due to one speciﬁc
behaviour, in this case breast cancer detection (r =−.056), and no evidence for differential effects
of gain- and loss-framed messages was found when breast cancer detection was excluded.
These meta-analyses thus seem to yield only limited support for the risk-framing hypothesis.
However, one limitation of these studies is that they did not distinguish between the different per-
suasive outcomes of message-framing studies (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012; Latimer, Salovey, &
Rothman, 2007). That is, they included studies that reported effects on attitudes, intentions and
behaviour in the same analysis, yielding an overall effect size for ‘persuasion’. Gallagher and Upde-
graff (2012) therefore set out to provide an updated meta-analysis of health message-framing
research, running separate analyses for immediate cognitive responses, like attitudes and intentions,
and behavioural responses. Following the risk-framing hypothesis, Gallagher and Updegraff
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hypothesised that gain-framed messages would be most effective for prevention behaviour, whereas
loss-framed messages would be most effective for detection behaviour.
The results of their meta-analysis showed that there were no differential effects of gain- and loss-
framed messages for detection behaviours, neither on immediate cognitive nor on behavioural
responses. For prevention behaviours, no effects were found for the immediate cognitive responses,
but a signiﬁcant advantage of gain-framed messages was found for behavioural responses (r = .083).
Subsequent analyses showed that the effects on different prevention behaviours ranged from r =
−.015 to r = .237, with signiﬁcant effects for skin cancer prevention, smoking cessation and physical
activity, and non-signiﬁcant effects for dietary and obesity-related behaviours, oral health behaviours,
safe sex and vaccination behaviours.
On account of the signiﬁcant advantage of gain-framed information for prevention behaviours,
Gallagher and Updegraff (2012) concluded that they ‘found support for Rothman and Salovey’s
underlying prediction for the moderating role of prevention vs. detection function on health behav-
iour’ (p. 113). Everything considered, however, interpreting these results as providing partial support
for the risk-framing hypothesis seems to be setting the bar quite low. After all, the study provided no
evidence for a loss-framed advantage in the domain of detection behaviour and found only limited
support for a gain-framed advantage in the domain of prevention behaviour. As with the direct
experimental evidence for the inﬂuence of behavioural function on the effects of framed messages,
the meta-analytic evidence in favour of the risk-framing hypothesis can be described as weak and
unconvincing (see also the meta-analysis by Tannenbaum et al. (2015), which found that the effec-
tiveness of fear appeals did not differ between prevention and detection behaviour).
One could argue that these results pose a major problem for the risk-framing hypothesis.
However, several authors have noted that it may still be used to predict message-framing effects,
even in the absence of convincing main effects of framing for prevention and detection behaviours.
These authors argue that other factors besides behavioural function also inﬂuence people’s percep-
tions of a behaviour as safe or risky and that the interaction between behavioural function and frame
may not materialise when these other factors are predominant (Latimer et al., 2007; Schneider et al.,
2001). For instance, even though smoking cessation clearly is a prevention behaviour, some people
might perceive quitting smoking as entailing many costs and consequently may be more responsive
to a loss-framed message than a gain-framed message (Schneider et al., 2001). In the following
section, we therefore turn to the evidence for the inﬂuence of perceived risk.
What about perceived risk?
Recently, Van ’t Riet et al. (2014) reviewed the available empirical evidence for an interaction between
perceived risk and message framing. They noted that different studies have used different operatio-
nalisations of risk, making comparisons difﬁcult. As detailed above, in the risk-framing hypothesis risk
is conceptualised as recipients’ perceptions of the potential downsides of the recommended behav-
iour. Indeed, several studies have investigated whether perceptions of the recommended behaviour’s
downsides moderate the effects of message framing (e.g., Cohen, 2010; Toll et al., 2008). Several other
studies, however, have operationalised risk as the uncertainty surrounding the recommended beha-
viour’s upsides (e.g., Bartels, Kelly, & Rothman, 2010), a practice that stays closer to prospect theory’s
original tenets. For both types of perceived risk, however, Van ’t Riet et al. have noted that the evi-
dence in favour of the risk-framing hypothesis is mixed. Whereas the results of some studies
showed support for the risk-framing hypothesis (e.g., Bartels et al., 2010; Meyers Levy & Maheswaran,
2004), other studies found only partial support (e.g, Hwang, Cho, Sands, & Jeong, 2012; Toll et al.,
2008), and yet other studies found no support (Cohen, 2010; Gallagher, Updegraff, Rothman, &
Sims, 2011). In addition, Van ’t Riet et al. presented the results of six studies, four of which tested
the inﬂuence of perceptions of the potential downsides of the recommended behaviour and two
of which tested the inﬂuence of the uncertainty surrounding the recommended behaviour’s
upsides. None of these six studies yielded support for the risk-framing hypothesis.
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In yet another conceptualisation of the term ‘risk’, several researchers have operationalised risk as
recipients’ baseline perceptions of their chances of falling ill (i.e., recipients’ perceived vulnerability
before having received the framed information). This third conceptualisation at ﬁrst glance seems
to yield more promising results than the previous two (Van ’t Riet et al., 2014), with several studies
ﬁnding a signiﬁcant effect in the hypothesised direction (e.g., Apanovitch, McCarthy, & Salovey,
2003; Gallagher et al., 2011; Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Hwang et al., 2012; but for non-support,
see Lalor & Hailey, 1989–1990; Millar & Millar, 2000). However, predicting an interaction between per-
ceived vulnerability and message-framing strays even further from prospect theory’s original tenets
than the risk-framing hypothesis does. After all, the risk-framing hypothesis holds that the effect of
framing is inﬂuenced by the risk that is associated with the recommended behaviour. But at least
for prevention behaviours, a ‘baseline’ estimate of the risk of falling ill (a smoker’s perception of
his own risk of contracting lung cancer, for instance) has no direct bearing on the risk that is associ-
ated with the recommended behaviour. If anything, such risk perceptions say more about the option
of non-compliance than about the option of compliance. After all, a smoker who considers himself to
be at risk of lung cancer should perceive non-compliance, thus continuing to smoke, as particularly
risky. If information about the positive consequences of the healthy behaviour makes people risk-
averse, as the risk-framing hypothesis holds, then gain-framed information should be particularly
likely to persuade this smoker to quit smoking. In spite of this logic, however, many researchers
have hypothesised that a high baseline-perceived vulnerability makes loss-framed messages more
persuasive than gain-framedmessages (Apanovitch et al., 2003; Gallagher et al., 2011; Gerend & Shep-
herd, 2007; Hwang et al., 2012), incorrectly deriving this expectation from the risk-framing hypothesis.
As such, a reliable interaction between baseline-perceived vulnerability and message framing cannot
be considered evidence in favour of the risk-framing hypothesis. Instead, if such an interaction is
found, we argue that alternative theorising should be employed to account for these ﬁndings.
In sum, while several studies ﬁnd support for the moderating role of perceived vulnerability, an
interaction between perceived vulnerability and message framing does not follow logically from
the risk-framing hypothesis or indeed prospect theory. It can be concluded that across the ﬁrst
two operationalisations, those that are most in line with the risk-framing hypothesis, the evidence
for the moderating role of risk is inconsistent. This conclusion was also reached by a recent systematic
review (Covey, 2014).
The use of additional hypotheses
A careful investigation of the health message-framing literature suggests that the research commu-
nity is sometimes more inclined to interpret speciﬁc results as partially in line with the risk-framing
hypothesis than as mostly inconsistent with it. For instance, Rothman et al. (1993) ﬁndings have
been generally taken to support their hypotheses, even though Study 1 failed to ﬁnd framing
effects for prevention behaviour, and only found differential effects of framed detection messages
for women, not for men. Their Study 2 found that gain- and loss-framed prevention messages had
no differential effects on ‘requesting information and sunscreen’, only on ‘the percentage of Level
15 sunscreen requested’ and again only in women. The failure to ﬁnd an effect in men was explained
by men’s supposed low interest in preventing or detecting skin cancer: attentive and elaborate pro-
cessing of the health-promoting messages was deemed necessary for framing effects to occur (see
also Rothman et al., 1999). Another study, however, found that gain-framed antismoking messages
were more persuasive than loss-framed messages, but this time only in people with a low NFC,
who presumably processed the information only superﬁcially (Steward, Schneider, Pizarro, &
Salovey, 2003). Even though the results of these studies are clearly at odds with each other, both
of them were taken to be in line with the risk-framing hypothesis.
Such reasoning seems to be quite common in the message-framing literature. Close inspection
reveals a large number of studies that claim to provide support for the risk-faming hypothesis, but
in fact were only able to ﬁnd support among subgroups of the sample. One study found support
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for the hypothesised interaction for some behavioural domains but not for others (Hwang et al.,
2012). Two studies found the expected effect only for women (Rothman et al., 1993; Toll et al.,
2008), while a third study found it only for men (Latimer-Cheung et al., 2012).
Sometimes clear non-support does not do the trick: when one study found an overall loss-framed
advantage for vaccination behaviour, clearly and unequivocally a prevention behaviour, the authors
did not overtly question the tenets of the risk-framing hypothesis, instead describing the results as ‘an
important exception to the commonly observed gain-framed advantage for preventive health beha-
viours’ (Gerend, Shepherd, & Monday, 2008; p. 221). As our overview of the message-framing litera-
ture has shown, however, this conﬁdence in the risk-framing hypothesis is not warranted.
Conclusion and a suggestion for the way forward
Our discussion of the basic tenets of the risk-framing hypothesis has shown that it has fundamental
theoretical ﬂaws, and a thorough investigation of the empirical evidence in favour of the risk-framing
hypothesis has shown that it is weak. In our view, it would be better to interpret this failure to ﬁnd
comprehensive support for the risk-framing hypothesis as reﬂecting its weaknesses, not as ‘partial
support’.
After discarding the risk-framing hypothesis, one cannot help but feel exasperated by how little
we actually know about message-framing effects. It seems that all we have to offer to health-pro-
motion practitioners is a plethora of potential message-framing moderators without an overarching
theoretical framework. To make matters worse, some of these moderators seem to have unstable
effects across studies. For example, one study found loss-framed messages to be more effective
than gain-framed messages for recipients with high self-efﬁcacy (Van ’t Riet, Ruiter, Werrij, & de
Vries, 2008), but another study found the opposite effect, with a gain-frame advantage for recipients
high in self-efﬁcacy (Werrij, Ruiter, Van ’t Riet, & De Vries, 2011). Likewise, one study found loss-framed
messages especially effective when recipients had been primed with the colour red (Gerend & Sias,
2009), but another study found the exact opposite pattern (Chien, 2011). For this reason, we suggest a
new approach is necessary for message-framing research. At the close of this article, we therefore
offer suggestions for such a new approach. As a comprehensive discussion of plausible hypotheses
is beyond the scope of this article, we will not focus on theory, but on study design and methodology.
We argue that in message-framing research, besides a need for new theory, there is an urgent need
for new methodology.
Central to our argument is the notion that researcher should ‘think small’ and closely investigate
all relevant psychological processes that occur when people are exposed to framed health messages.
As one reviewer of the present article rightfully noted, the nature of the message-framing paradigm
(gain- vs. loss-framed messages containing essentially equivalent information) is bound to result in
small effects. If participants in all conditions receive the same information, it cannot be expected
that there will be large differences in persuasive outcomes. Even small effects, however, may translate
to substantial changes at the population level. In addition, small shifts in one variable can have impor-
tant effects over time if they are self-reinforcing (cf. Slater, 2007) or if they inﬂuence other important
variables (cf. Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002). Rather than discarding message
framing as not consequential, it is therefore warranted to understand its effects, even as these are
expected to be small. In fact, we argue that researchers should embrace this ‘smallness’. Only after
we have achieved a better understanding of the small immediate effects of message framing can
we hope to investigate how these effects can translate into behaviour at the population level over
time.
Unfortunately, the research into these small effects is hampered by studies employing long health
messages in which a number of things are going on that could potentially affect the way recipients
process, understand or react to it. Therefore, we propose a message-framing research agenda where
researchers focus on the details of framed messages and the subtle effects that these details can
have.
HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 455
For instance, recipients can be inﬂuenced by ‘antecedent framing’, but also by ‘consequent
framing’. To understand what we mean by this, consider the following sentence that is typical of
messages used in message-framing research: ‘If you quit smoking, your chance of lung cancer will
decrease’. The sentence basically constitutes a conditional proposition with an antecedent (‘if you
quit smoking’) and a consequent (‘your chance of lung cancer will decrease’). Message framing is
often understood as antecedent framing, where the loss-framed equivalent of the above-mentioned
sentence would be: ‘If you don’t quit smoking, your chance of lung cancer will increase’. But O’Keefe
and Jensen (2006) have already pointed out that, besides the antecedents, the choice of consequents
can also affect the persuasive effects of health messages. Here, the consequents of the recipients’
behaviour are cast in essentially negative terms, referring to his or her chance to get lung cancer.
But they could just as well be cast in positive terms, as in: ‘If you quit smoking, your chance of a
healthy life will increase’. In fact, if we would contrast this latter sentence with our original one,
we are in fact not engaging in antecedent framing, but in consequent framing, where the conse-
quents of the decision are framed positively or negatively.
Research suggests that consequent framing matters. For instance, one study found that, when
consequents were framed positively, positive antecedent framing (e.g., ‘If you perform the healthy
behaviour’) was more effective than negative antecedent framing (e.g., ‘If you don’t perform the
healthy behaviour’), while the reverse was true when consequents were framed negatively
(Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004). In general, however, the issue of antecedent and consequent
framing is ignored in the message-framing literature. In fact, it is quite common to confound ante-
cedent framing and consequent framing in message framing experiments. For example, one study
employed a gain-framed message that was entitled ‘Great Breath, Healthy Gums Only a Floss
Away’, while the loss-framed message was entitled ‘Floss Now and Avoid Bad Breath and Gum
Disease’ (Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004). The gain-framed message included the phrase ‘ﬂossing
your teeth daily [… ] promotes great breath’, while the equivalent phrase in the loss-framed message
was ‘if you don’t ﬂoss your teeth daily [this] causes bad breath’. In this study, then, antecedent
framing and consequent framing were clearly confounded. To increase our understanding of
message-framing effects, we argue that antecedent framing and consequent framing should be
manipulated and investigated independently from each other (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004).
But the challenge does not stop there. The use of negations is another issue that deserves atten-
tion in message-framing research. Consider again our gain- and loss-framed sentences on smoking
cessation above and notice that the loss-framed sentence includes a negation (‘if you don’t’),
whereas the gain-framed sentence does not. Research has shown that including negations in
verbal material slows down information processing and makes it more error-prone (Clark & Chase,
1972; Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). Thus, stressing the consequences of
quitting smoking may be objectively equivalent to stressing the consequences of not quitting
smoking, but the use of negations in the loss-framed message may cause the resulting psychological
processes to be divergent. Unfortunately, message framing is confounded with the use of negations
in most studies. For instance, the study referred to above included negations in the loss-framed
message, but not in the gain-framed message.
Of course, researchers could choose to apply antecedent framing without the use of negations.
The loss-framed sentence in our example would then be: ‘If you continue to smoke, your chance
of lung cancer will increase’. But it is far from clear that distinct phrases will be perceived in the
same way. After all, it is known that asking people whether something should be ‘allowed’ can
yield vastly different results from asking whether the same thing should ‘not be forbidden’. It
seems that these two constructs, while logically equivalent, carry different meanings for most
people (Holleman, 2006). So who is to say that ‘quitting smoking’ and ‘not continuing smoking’
are perceived as equivalent in people’s minds? And who is to say that ‘[not obtaining] great
breath’ is perceived as equivalent to ‘avoiding bad breath’? In other words, in one single study
(Mann et al., 2004), antecedent framing was confounded with consequent framing, the use of nega-
tions and distinct phrasing. Although not all message-framing publications provide the full texts of
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the employed messages, we suspect that such confounds are extremely common in message-
framing studies, profoundly complicating the enterprise of trying to understand what goes on in
message-framing effects.
In sum, we suggest that subtle differences in a health-promoting message beside its frame may
inﬂuence recipients’ reactions to the message. Unfortunately, traditional message-framing research
is poorly equipped to deal with this complexity. A single gain-framed message of perhaps 200
words contains a number of things that can have some effect on the recipients. In most studies,
then, it is impossible to tease out which of these factors caused the effect. We argue that the way
around this is to conduct particularly ﬁne-grained analyses, employing controlled settings and
responsive outcome measures. Perhaps most importantly, ‘pure’ manipulations are necessary, in
which antecedent framing is not confounded with consequent framing, negations or other important
factors. As an example, Brüll, Ruiter, and Jansma (2016) conducted a ﬁrst EEG-study in which they
investigated the effect of single sentences which were either gain- or loss-framed on event-related
potentials (ERPs) known to be relevant for language processing. Their results showed that sentences
with negations and, independently, loss-framed sentences elicited ERPs usually associated with pro-
cessing difﬁculties, leading the authors to conclude that afﬁrmed gain frames may lead to improved
processing.
The leap from processing a single sentence to the decision to change one’s behaviour is substan-
tial. So we understand that research focusing on the small effects of subtle manipulations may not be
very inspiring to those who want to conduct research that can lead to immediate improvements of
health-promotion practice. But we argue that an in-depth analysis of message framing is more worth-
while than another large-scale ﬁeld experiment using 200-word messages and behavioural outcome
measures. In the long run, the more granular approach may provide a better path to understanding
how message framing can inﬂuence recipients in subtle but consistent ways. When this is the case,
follow-up studies can investigate how these subtle effects inﬂuence actual health behaviour.
Regardless of one’s opinion of these suggestions, which space will not allow us to elaborate on
further, the present article clearly shows that there is no convincing support, either theoretical or
empirical, for the risk-framing hypothesis. While the risk-framing hypothesis has been central to
message-framing research for the past 15 years and can be considered established doctrine in the
health message-framing ﬁeld, the present article shows it is time that researchers turn their attention
to other hypotheses in the ﬁeld of message framing.
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